Contingent purchase price that depends on post-close performance — how earnouts bridge valuation gaps and retain key people.
An earnout is a portion of the purchase price that the seller receives later, contingent on the acquired company hitting performance targets after the deal closes.
Instead of paying the full price at closing, the buyer says: "We'll pay $30M now and up to $10M more over the next 2-3 years if the business hits these revenue/EBITDA targets."
| Component | Amount |
|---|---|
| Upfront cash at close | $30M |
| Earnout Year 1 | Up to $5M if EBITDA >= $6M |
| Earnout Year 2 | Up to $5M if EBITDA >= $6.5M |
| Maximum total | $40M |
If Year 1 EBITDA comes in at $5.5M (below threshold), the seller gets $0 for that year. If Year 2 hits $7M, they get the full $5M.
The Operator's View
Earnouts are probably the most heavily litigated aspect of post-closing M&A disputes. The construct is inherently combustible: the performance of a business that is no longer under the seller’s control determines whether additional proceeds get paid. Depending on the deal structure and the seller’s financial situation, those proceeds might feel like icing on the cake—or they might feel like a very real reduction to the purchase price they thought they were getting.
The instinct to simplify is understandable. Tie the earnout to something binary—a contract award, for example—and you sidestep the ambiguity. That was my thinking early in my investment banking career, when I knew enough to be dangerous but only enough to be dangerous. I learned quickly how much daylight can exist between an award and what was modeled: scope changes, period of performance differences, bid protests, or the uncomfortable reality that the seller may control the proposal while the buyer controls the price.
Since then, I’ve structured every earnout around legally well-defined gross profit. Not revenue—buyers have legitimate concerns about low-margin, low-quality revenue inflating a payout. Not EBITDA—sellers have legitimate concerns about buyers loading up indirect spend to suppress the number. Gross profit meets both parties in the middle. It isn’t immune from disputes, but it directly answers the question the earnout is supposed to be asking: did this business actually perform?